China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is currently ranked as the third most powerful military in the world, behind only the United States and Russia. Its naval arm, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy), is actually larger than the US Navy, currently consisting of an active duty battle force of around 370 platforms. Moreover, that number is a likely underestimate since it does not include smaller-scale vessels that can be equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in a hypothetical conflict near Taiwan; for example, the Type 022 (Houbei Class) patrol boats that pose a credible risk to blue water platforms while not being able to traverse the open oceans themselves. Nor does it include the irregular forces that could be brought to bear in any conflict in China’s littoral waters, such as the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).
The Shipbuilding Gap
How the PLA Navy continues to expand over the short- and medium-term is a matter of mounting concern for US policymakers and military strategists. China’s ongoing shipbuilding and force modernization programs expect to grow the PLA Navy to 395 ships by 2025, and 435 ships by 2030. In contrast, the US Navy was fielding 296 battle ships as of August 2024, and US efforts to catch up are complicated by the yawning gap in shipbuilding capacity between China and the United States. Just how big is this gap? According to a leaked US Navy briefing, China has a domestic shipbuilding capacity 232 times greater than the United States.
Qualitative Convergence
The PLA Navy may be winning in terms of quantity, but the US maintains a qualitative edge, albeit one that is rapidly diminishing over time. To quote an unclassified US naval intelligence briefing on China’s shipbuilding program in 2020: “Chinese naval ship design and material quality is in many cases comparable to [US Navy] ships, and China is quickly closing the gaps in any areas of deficiency.” There is some fog of war here in that the PLA Navy remains untested by actual combat with a peer adversary, and the opaque nature of China’s politics typically obscures any disclosure that might suggest the modernization program is not a rousing success, with some notable exceptions such as the reported sinking of a cutting-edge submarine while in dock in September 2024.
This backgrounder will break down the PLA Navy by vessel type, examining force structure, capabilities, new platforms, respective roles in China’s overall maritime strategy:
Force Structure: The Evolution of Chinese Carrier Power
The hallmark of China’s naval modernization is its aircraft carrier program, which serves as the vanguard of its regional power projection.

China currently possesses three aircraft carriers, the Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian. These carriers, with their expansive flight decks, are central to the PLA Navy’s power projection capacity, enabling the launch and retrieval of fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft.
The PLA Navy’s first aircraft carrier was the Liaoning (Type 001). Commissioned in 2012, the Liaoning is a refitted Soviet Kuznetsov-class vessel. It serves mainly as a training and weapons testing platform, though it remains fully operational for combat.
The Shandong (Type 002), commissioned in 2019, is China’s first domestically built carrier and is regarded as an improved version of the Liaoning, featuring more advanced systems. The ship weighs around 70,000 tons at full load and is both longer and heavier than the Liaoning. In a modification from the original Kuznetsov design, the Shandong swaps out missile launch capacity for a larger air wing, which consists mostly of Shenyang J-15s jets (an estimated 36), along with Changhe Z-18 and Harbin Z-9 helicopters. Neither the Shandong nor the Liaoning are equipped with a catapult, limiting the potential loadouts of their air wings.
The most recent addition to the PLA Navy is the Fujian (Type 003), launched in 2022, which represents a significant leap in capability with its flat-top design and electromagnetic catapults, representing an advance on the steam-powered catapults used in most US carriers. The Fujian is believed to weigh in at around 80,000-85,000 pounds at full capacity, making it the largest conventionally powered carrier in the world. Its large flight deck and catapult allow for a larger and more advanced air wing, which was revealed in 2025 to include Shenyang J-15Ts (modified for catapult takeoff and recovery), Shenyang J-35s (the PLA’s fifth-generation stealth fighter), and notably the Xian KJ-600 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. The KJ-600, which only made its maiden flight in 2020, will greatly extends the radar horizon of the carrier group and coordinate protection from incoming threats.
Concerns have recently been raised about certain aspects of the Fujian’s design, which limit the carrier’s aircraft launch rate compared to US carriers. These include having only two launch catapults (the USS Ford has four); an island placement that limits deck space; and aircraft elevators that are too forward placed. All issues trace back to the Fujian’s conventional propulsion and will presumably be addressed in future, nuclear-powered models. They could also be remnants of a shift from steam-powered to electromagnetic catapults, which reportedly happened midway through the design process. The Fujian’s electromagnetic catapults were widely celebrated as evidence that the PLA was closing the qualitative gap with the US Navy. Incidentally, the catapults have since become a political issue in the United States, with President Trump frequently calling for a return to steam catapults and hydraulic elevators due to reliability issues that plague the new Ford-class systems.
A fourth PLA Navy aircraft carrier is currently under construction. Early satellite photos suggest that the new carrier will be larger than even the US Navy’s Ford Class, with space for an air wing of up to 100. It is also believed to be the first Chinese model to feature nuclear propulsion; however, there are indications that significant technical challenges have yet to be solved. Looking ahead, there are plans to field a total of 5-6 carriers by the 2030s.
China’s aircraft carriers differ from their US counterparts in that they are designed to operate exclusively under the protective “bubble” created by China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, particularly within the first island chain. These A2/AD systems intend to restrict the US Navy from entering key areas, allowing China’s carriers to function in a more localized context, supporting power projection closer to home. The carriers, therefore, are not the core of China’s fleet but rather play a supporting role within a broader defensive strategy aimed at controlling regional waters and limiting US naval reach. The strategy strikes a contrast to that of the United States, which employs carriers as the central plank of a blue water projection capacity.
LONDON, Feb 6 (Reuters) – As Biden administration national security adviser Jake Sullivan met General Zhang Youxia in August 2024, the tired and strained look on the American’s face contrasted with the relaxed smile of the veteran Chinese officer, then at the height of his power as the top uniformed member of the People’s Liberation Army.
“Your request to meet with me shows the value you attach to military security and the relationship between our militaries,” Zhang told the U.S. delegation led by Sullivan.
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The Biden team had hoped that building dialogue with the PLA would reduce the risk of accidental war, something they feared might one day be sparked by an inadvertent clash by air or sea, or perhaps a misidentified cyber attack or missile.
That process, already stumbling in the 2020s, may now need to be comprehensively restarted – if that is even possible.
Last month, as the world’s media focused on Donald Trump and Greenland, China’s official media announced that General Zhang, a childhood friend of President Xi Jinping once described as like a “brother”, had been dismissed from office.
It was the latest of a string of removals that have now included almost every top Chinese commander. Exactly what is going on behind the scenes is impossible to know, but the implications for the rest of the world may well be enormous.
Alongside Xi, General Zhang – one of the few remaining combat veterans in the PLA after serving as a company commander during China’s brief 1979 war with Vietnam – was one of the key decision-makers over whether Beijing might risk an invasion of Taiwan in the current decade. He was also a key interlocutor with the Kremlin on growing Russia-China relations.
SWEEPING PURGE
Now, not only is he gone, but so are dozens if not hundreds of other senior military figures cashiered over the past two years. They include, analysts say, a disproportionate number of those from Beijing’s critical and fast-expanding nuclear deterrence forces, and those in the capital Beijing and the Eastern Theatre Command responsible for any action on Taiwan.
The most recent purges have devastated the normally seven-person Central Military Commission, chaired by Xi himself with his boyhood friend as his senior deputy. The only two members left untouched now appear to be Xi and General Zhang Shengmin, the shadowy head of its discipline committee.The monks are on a walk across nine states with the aim of raising, quote, “awareness of peace, loving-kindness, and compassion across America and the worlZhang Shengmin is usually described as having come from among the PLA’s political officers, implying an almost complete purge of those with more mainstream military service.
According to U.S. officials, the Chinese president has told the PLA to be ready to win a battle for Taiwan by or in 2027 – although they have also increasingly stressed that this is not the same as a direct decision to invade Taiwan on that date.
What is clear, they say, is that at the start of the decade Xi took a series of military targets that had been set for 2035 and brought them forward to 2027.
With the PLA now within a year of that deadline, the Chinese president now seems very unhappy with his military high command.
Multiple official statements and news stories over the dismissal of Zhang and others have accused them of corruption, including one piece in the PLA Daily that accused “big rats” of eating into the military budget.
Another piece in that paper this week went so far as to describe China’s resulting military as just a “paper tiger”.
DISARRAY AND DECEPTION
If this disparaging reference genuinely reflects the views of China’s leadership – or even if it doesn’t, it would be a remarkable turnaround in language.
China has gone to great lengths to present itself as a rising military power, with its ever-escalating drills around Taiwan designed to send an unambiguous message to that island that “reunification” is inevitable, even if done by force.
Recent messaging around the removal of its military leaders appears to tear up that approach, at least for now.
This points to the least likely but most dangerous interpretation of recent events – that Beijing is going out of its way to look unprepared for military action as a deliberate deception manoeuvre, but that it actually views the mayhem of the new Trump administration as the best time to act.
Even before these recent moves, some China-watching analysts had expressed concern Beijing might become incentivised to move quicker than expected. They worried that U.S. military buildups and the deployment of high-tech unmanned weapons – as well as Taiwan’s own military rebuilding – might shift the strategic balance away from Beijing’s favour.
That should not be discounted – and even as the Pentagon prepares for potential military action on Iran and ongoing talk of further action in the Caribbean, it will be watching China’s military movements as closely as ever.
In Washington, though, there has been a growing feeling the balance of risk might be shifting to later in the decade – and that Beijing is keen to see the outcome of Taiwan’s 2028 election in the hope the more pro-mainland Kuomintang might regain office in Taipei, and could also be waiting to see who might prevail in the U.S. 2028 elections.
The most likely explanation, therefore, is that the schism between Xi and his top commanders is extremely real.
China is hardly the only country awkwardly discovering that spending vast quantities of money on arms in the 21st century so far has not always brought it what it wanted – but Xi may feel he has other reasons to be nervous about his senior soldiers.
Still, the fact the PLA’s own newspaper felt able to refer to China’s military capability as a “paper tiger” suggests its editors or their Communist Party masters believe the military rank-and-file might also share Xi’s feeling that Beijing’s armed forces have been let down by their seniors.
That may or may not mean that some of the wilder stories over wastage in Beijing’s new atomic missile fields – vast networks of silos housing intercontinental ballistic rockets – are truly accurate, including tales of fuel replaced with water and concrete crumbling within months of their construction.
According to the Pentagon, China is involved in a massive nuclear expansion programme to match U.S. and Russian arsenals. A Wall Street Journal report suggested Zhang’s suspected crime was discussing unspecified “nuclear secrets” with U.S. counterparts.
The fact that story is doing the rounds at all in China, though, suggests that contact with the U.S. touching on any element of Beijing’s military posture may now be seen as criminal – and a serious and perhaps fatal crime at that.
That could act as a wrecking ball to remaining if already often unsuccessful U.S. efforts to build closer military-to-military relations with Beijing.
CUTTING BACK RELATIONS?
From the beginning of the century, U.S. and other Western officials, academics and think-tanks have invested considerable effort in cultivating dialogue with both senior current and former members of the PLA. Access to senior serving PLA officials, however, has largely dried up lately.
Outside those who have met through the most traditional diplomatic channels – embassy military attaches, for example – it is now relatively common to find even a well-connected Western China-watcher has not had a personal interaction with a PLA general or equivalent for more than half a decade. That is a dramatic shift from the previous era.
That shift is not quite as binary as it can be presented -Chinese PLA officials remain part of a growing diplomatic circuit in the “Global South”, where they encounter similarly active Western counterparts. Direct U.S.-China military relations, though, have become much harder to pursue.
In 2022, Beijing cancelled them altogether following the Taiwan visit of U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Getting national security adviser Sullivan in front of General Zhang two years later took patient diplomacy, eventually signed off by Xi himself after his own meeting with Sullivan on the same trip to Beijing was seen to have gone well.
The meeting with Zhang yielded an initial agreement for the head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo, to engage directly with China’s individual theatre commanders.
That led to a video call and then a visit to Hawaii for PLA Southern Theatre Commander General Wu Yunan, who is responsible for the highly contested South China Sea region.
U.S. commanders were keen to meet with him to discuss clashes around disputed islands including with the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally.
But U.S. officials said they also wanted to open dialogue with Eastern Theatre chief Lin Xiangyang, the commander most responsible for operations and planning around Taiwan. Lin had made a highly public conference speech in spring 2025 pledging that the PLA was ready to move against Taiwan if ordered.
Both Wu and Lin appear to have since been purged.
Whatever China’s military is told to do next – as well as what it thinks about subjects including the future of Taiwan and rule of an ageing Xi – was already getting harder to know beyond the publications of the PLA itself.
However, top U.S. decision-makers will also be able to access whatever their spy agencies can intercept.
Even as Xi talks trade with the U.S., Canada and Europe, he may now have decided to cut the PLA out of communications with the West. At the age of 73, that may be designed to display Xi’s strength. At worst, though, it might look like another superpower on the edge of chaos on a scale unseen since the 1991 break-up of the Soviet Union.
there is a central—and increasingly urgent—correlation between China’s physical naval expansion and the internal instability of its military leadership.
This relationship can be viewed as a “Quantity vs. Quality/Cohesion” trade-off. While the PLA Navy is physically growing at an unprecedented rate, the human and structural elements tasked with commanding that force are being aggressively dismantled and reorganized.
The Dual Correlation: Expansion vs. Erasure
There are two primary ways these trends correlate:
1. The “Paper Tiger” Correlation (Readiness vs. Procurement)
The article highlights a discrepancy between the massive influx of hardware (the “Quantity”) and the reported corruption within the command structure (the “Quality”).
- The Trend: China is building ships (like the Type 003 Fujian) at a rate 232 times faster than the U.S.
- The Correlation: The “Sweep” of leaders—including those in charge of the Rocket Force and Eastern Theatre Command—suggests that the rapid expansion may have been fueled by “big rats” (corruption).
- The Result: If ships are built using inferior materials or if promotions were bought rather than earned, the “paper tiger” label suggests that the physical size of the navy does not correlate with its actual combat effectiveness.
2. The “2027 Deadline” Correlation (Political Will vs. Strategic Restraint)
The article connects the accelerated modernization goals (shifting 2035 targets to 2027) with the sudden disappearance of the military’s “Old Guard.”
- The Trend: Xi Jinping has centralized power, reducing the Central Military Commission (CMC) from seven members to essentially two.
- The Correlation: By purging veteran combat officers like General Zhang Youxia, Xi is removing the very leaders who might offer realistic, cautious advice about the risks of a Taiwan invasion.
- The Result: As the fleet grows (reaching an estimated 435 ships by 2030), the internal “checks and balances” that might prevent an accidental or premature war are being removed. The correlation here is that as the Navy becomes more physically capable, the leadership becomes more politically isolated and prone to miscalculation.
Summary of the Strategic Gap
| Metric | The Naval Expansion (External) | The Military Purge (Internal) |
| Focus | Procurement, tonnage, and technology. | Loyalty, obedience, and anti-corruption. |
| Key Indicator | Launch of the Fujian and 4th carrier. | Removal of Gen. Zhang and Gen. Lin. |
| Strategic Goal | Dominance of the “First Island Chain.” | Absolute Party control over “the Gun.” |
| Risk Factor | “Yawning gap” in U.S. ship capacity. | “Institutional brittleness” and lack of experience. |
The Bottom Line
The article suggests that the PLA Navy is a formidable machine currently lacking a stable driver. The correlation is that the more “ready” the equipment looks on paper (reaching the 2027 milestone), the more “unready” the command structure appears due to the vacuum of experienced, professional leadership.

















